











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission.  
JOINT CENTER  
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES 
 
 





Related Publication 06-17 
June 2006 
 
                                                           
* The author is Director of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Senior Fellow in the 
Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and Vice President for Research and Policy at the 
Kauffman Foundation.  Among his former positions, he was a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department (1993-95). The views are his own and do not necessarily 
represent the views of any of the organizations with which he is affiliated. This research is funded by the 
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.  The author is grateful for the research assistance of 
Jesse Gurman and for the comments of Robert Hahn and Ed Kane on an earlier draft.   Executive Summary 
 
One would have thought that by now all of the artificial barriers that prevent banks and 
other financial service firms from competing would have been removed. In the 1990s, Congress 
enacted two sweeping financial deregulation bills, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1994 that finally treated banks like other firms in the economy and let them 
operate nationwide, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which permitted banks to affiliate with a 
broad range of other financial service firms.   
 
  The 1994 Act contained one seemingly minor restriction, however: fearing that interstate 
authority would lead banks to engage excessively in mergers, Congress put caps on the share of 
domestic deposits that any banking organization could hold: 10 percent nationwide, 30 percent in 
any individual state (subject to modification by individual states). These numbers were chosen 
arbitrarily – the national cap in particular has no rationale in antitrust law or economics – but, at 
the time, they also seemed relatively innocuous, since no depository institution then had deposits 
that put it even close to either cap. 
 
  That is no longer true today. Several banks have domestic deposits that are nearly at or 
close to the nationwide cap. This essay argues that now that the caps are binding, or nearly so, 
they are also counterproductive. They artificially encourage U.S. banking organizations to 
expand into non-banking businesses and abroad, while giving foreign banks an artificial 
advantage in bidding for U.S. banks. Furthermore, by limiting the ability of banks to compete 
and expand, the caps are detrimental to the interests of the consumers they presumably were 
designed to protect.   
 
  Congress can correct this situation, ideally by removing both caps, and subject depository 
institution mergers to the same legal standards that have long applied to mergers among firms in 
other industries. As fallback measures, Congress could repeal just the national cap and/or could 
change the way the nationwide cap is calculated, to make it less inimical to the interest of 
consumers. 
   1
It’s Time to Let Banks (Even Big Ones) Compete 
 




The last two decades have seen a revolution in the financial services industry -- 
banking in particular -- unleashed in large part by major federal legislative changes.  
In 1989 and 1991, after a rash of failures of banks and savings and loans, 
Congress toughened capital standards for depository institutions, or requirements that 
these institutions back a set percentage of their deposits with shareholders’ money. Bank 
and thrift failures have fallen dramatically since then.  
In 1994, Congress took a similarly bold step and, for the first time in the nation’s 
history, put banks on the same footing with other companies by allowing them to operate 
in multiple states – that is, to set up “branches” in other states that did not affirmatively 
“opt out” of this interstate system. Up to that time, banking organizations could operate in 
multiple states only through “holding companies” that owned separately chartered banks, 
each with its own boards of directors and officers and various regulatory limitations, in 
each state. Interstate branching dispensed with the need for this cumbersome structure 
and allowed a single bank to operate throughout the country (subject to states opting out 
of the system).  
In 1999, Congress went even further, and after a nearly two decade-long debate, 
allowed banks and financial companies to own each other through a new “financial 
holding company” authorized by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).
1 The results of 
GLBA, however, have been relatively disappointing, since only a handful of major 
companies have taken full advantage of the Act’s permissions, and the one “poster child” 
for the Act – Citigroup – actually has retrenched somewhat in recent years, selling off 
parts of its insurance underwriting business.  
                                                 
1 GLBA amended the Bank Holding Company Act, which granted bank holding companies limited abilities 
to move into other financial businesses, and effectively repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which had 
separated commercial and investment banking, but whose restrictions had been somewhat relaxed through 
regulation in the late 1980s and 1990s by the Federal Reserve Board. The GLBA also permitted the new 
financial conglomerates to own insurance underwriters and agents.   2
Nonetheless, in combination, the foregoing legislative changes have led to 
sweeping changes in the financial services industry, banking in particular. Many more 
banks are operating in multiple states, and some are allied with other financial activities, 
(although for political reasons, banking organizations are still being stopped from 
providing real estate brokerage services, a natural financially-related activity where 
banking organizations could provide helpful competition).
2 It would seem, therefore, that 
not much remains to be done on the public policy front to permit financial service 
companies the same or similar degree of competitive freedom that non-financial 
enterprises enjoy. 
This is mostly right, but not entirely. The Riegle-Neal Act, while broadly enabling 
interstate branching, also prohibits any interstate merger in which the resulting banking 
organization (including a bank and its affiliates) would control more than 10 percent of 
the nationwide deposits of “insured depository institutions” (insured banks and savings 
and loans, and insured U.S. branches of foreign banks), or more than 30 percent of such 
deposits in any particular state (although the states are permitted to set higher or lower 
statewide caps). These arbitrary restrictions on bank expansion were inserted into the Act 
to assuage concerns at the time that, without the deposit caps, some banks could 
eventually dominate the U.S. banking market – despite the fact that the antitrust laws 
would continue to apply and the long record of the Justice Department’s Antitrust 
Division and the federal banking agencies in challenging bank mergers up to that time 
that, like mergers in any other industry, threatened competition.  
This essay argues that if the caps were ever justified they are not now, and in fact, 
are generating perverse results. Ideally, the caps – the nationwide cap in particular – 
should be removed. The antitrust laws, and the agencies that enforce them, are fully 
adequate to address any concerns about undue banking concentration. Should Congress 
not go this far, the essay outlines alternatives that would ease the current restrictions, 
thereby reducing their counter-productive impacts and enhancing competition in banking 
and financial markets. 
 
                                                 
2 See Robert Hahn, Robert E. Litan, and Jesse Gurman, 2005. “Paying Less for Real Estate Brokerage: 
What Can Make It Happen?” AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper, 05-11, June.   3
 
2. The Deposit Caps: Background 
 
  The notion that the federal government should cap deposit shares of banks was 
first placed on the Congressional agenda in 1991, when Congress was considering the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”). Ultimately, 
Congress enacted FDICIA – which clarified capital standards for banks – but without any 
caps (which passed the Senate but not the House). The same national (10 percent) and 
state-specific caps (30 percent) that were considered in 1991 again surfaced three years 
later when Congress was considering the removal of the long-standing restrictions on 
interstate branching. This time, the caps were included in the final Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, and were defined only on the basis of a 
bank’s percentage of national insured deposits, excluding such functional equivalents of 
bank deposits as money market fund balances and credit union deposit accounts.  
An obvious question is why Congress believed that specific caps were necessary. 
After all, in 1994, the national banking market was hardly concentrated. As shown in 
Table 1, the largest bank holding company in the United States then had less than 4 
percent of national deposits held in banks and thrift institutions.    4
 
Table 1 
Top Nationwide Domestic Deposit Shares, Bank Holding Companies 
June, 1994 
 
Organization     Deposits  (Billions)   Percentage 
 
BankAmerica     118     3.7 
NationsBank     85     2.7 
Chemical  Bank   70     2.2 
Banc  One     61     1.9 
Citicorp     55     1.8 
First  Union     51     1.6 
First  Interstate     47     1.5 
Keycorp     44     1.4 
Wells  Fargo     41     1.3 
Chase  Manhattan    37     1.2 
 
Source: FDIC Summary of Deposits 
 
  Of course, it is difficult to look into the minds of “Congress” – a body of 535 
elected officials – for what it intended in any piece of legislation. Courts typically look to 
the language of the Committee reports on particular pieces of legislation, as well as floor 
statements of bill sponsors, for clues. In this particular case, there is little to go on. The 
Senate Committee Report in connection with FDICIA, where the concentration issue was 
earlier considered, says simply that “relaxing historical restrictions on interstate banking 
is not intended to allow large banks to acquire undue financial power nationwide or in 
individual states.”
3 [italics added]. A similar broadly defined concern about financial 
power must explain why, since the 1994 Act was enacted and as of year-end 2005, 13 
states had enacted lower statewide caps than 30 percent, while 6 had set higher caps, as 
shown in Table 2 (All of the rest of the states had either adopted the 30 percent cap in 
Riegle-Neal or defaulted to it).  
                                                 
3 Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection of 1991, Report of the Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing 
Office), p. 72. It was also well known at the time, of course, that smaller banks and state banking 
supervisors had opposed interstate branching. See Edward J. Kane, 1996. “De Jure Interstate Banking: Why 
Only Now?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, No. 2, May, pp. 141-61.   5
Table 2 
State Deposit Cap Laws Different From The 30 Percent Cap 
 
       C a p   L e v e l  
Increased Cap 
 
H a w a i i         N o n e  
I d a h o         N o n e  
M i c h i g a n        N o n e  
U t a h         N o n e  
Alaska        50% 




Arkansas         25% 
Mississippi       25% 
W e s t   V i r g i n i a        2 5 %  
North  Dakota       25% 
Colorado       25% 
Montana       22% 
Oklahoma       20% 
T e x a s         2 0 %  
O h i o         2 0 %  
I o w a         1 5 %  
K a n s a s         1 5 %  
Kentucky       15% 
Nebraska       14% 
Missouri       13% 
 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the American Bankers Association   
  
 
  But what is “undue financial power”? The conventional answer would be that 
power is “undue” when a firm has the ability to affect price or output, or in other words, 
what is known in the antitrust world as “market power.” Yet the most used antitrust test 
for market power -- the joint merger guidelines of the Justice Department and the Federal 
Trade Commission, which have been in place since the early 1980s -- implies market 
share thresholds that would be well above the 10 percent nationwide deposit market share 
cap. In particular, the joint guidelines define a market as “highly concentrated” – and thus 
having firms that are most likely to be able to exercise some power over price or output –   6
only where the sum of the squared deposit shares of firms in the market is over 1800.
4 
The lowest firm-specific market share to which this definition corresponds is roughly 20 
percent, or double the 10 percent nationwide deposit share limit in Riegle-Neal.
5  
  An even more fundamental problem with nationwide or statewide deposit caps 
exists, however. As already noted, the antitrust laws already prohibit banking 
organizations from merging where the effect would be to substantially lessen competition 
in any relevant banking market (or to create a monopoly in any such market). What is a 
“relevant banking market”? Courts and the agencies consistently looked to local areas – 
cities and towns where banks compete – and not to the state or national level. This 
reflects a fundamental reality that for most customers, whether placing deposits or 
seeking loans, banking is like politics: all the action is local. Furthermore, it is at the local 
level where banking markets historically have been much more concentrated than at the 
state or national levels, and accordingly, in many instances in the past where banks have 
applied to merge, the Justice Department and/or the banking agencies have required the 
acquiring bank to divest certain offices to ensure that competition will not be threatened 
by the merger.
6 
  In contrast, those banking customers who look to national banks tend to have 
many more choices, where banking is not only less concentrated than in local markets, 
but also many borrowers in particular have alternatives to banks for funds. Smaller 
companies can turn to finance companies or insurers for loans. Larger, public companies 
have been increasingly turning to the securities markets to raise capital rather than banks.  
  So what could justify Congress picking on the banking industry in particular 
(broadly defined to include thrift institutions) and placing market share limits on mergers 
that are more strict than for any other industry in the U.S. economy? This question seems 
especially salient given the possibility that banks with a broader national presence (one 
                                                 
4 This definition and the calculation that goes with it is referred to as the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.”  
5 For example, suppose the nationwide banking market consists of just five banks, each with a 20 percent 
share. The square of 20 percent is 400, which multiplied by 5 would equal 2000, or a figure just above the 
HHI threshold of 1800.  
6 See, e.g. Dean F. Amel, 1997. “Antitrust Policy in Banking: Current Status and Future Prospects,” 
Proceedings of the 33
rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (Chicago: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago). In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Riegle-Neal Act does not seem to permit banks 
involved in a merger that would otherwise violate the 10 percent deposit market share cap to avoid 
exceeding the ceiling by arranging, as part of the merger, for appropriate divestitures.    7
that would likely require them to exceed the 10 percent deposit market share cap in the 
Rielge-Neal Act) may improve consumer welfare by enabling their deposit and lending 
customers to have the convenience of using the same bank, whenever they move, 
temporarily or permanently, and to firms that establish new locations within the country. 
Below I outline and then analyze several concerns that have been discussed from 
time to time over the years, including the period when Riegle-Neal was considered. I 
conclude that these concerns today are without basis, and that even if one or more had 
some justification, they should be balanced against the offsetting costs and counter-
productive impacts that the current deposit market share caps are having.   
 
3. Analyzing Possible Rationales for the Deposit Market Share Caps 
 
  To go beyond the antitrust laws, and to impose tighter merger restrictions for 
banks than for any other type of firm in the U.S. economy, policy makers should have 
more than broadly stated concerns or fears of “undue concentration” because, in 
principle, such vaguely worded concerns could be voiced about other industries. So, why 
single out banks? I can think of three possible reasons.  
 
To prevent concentration of undue political power  
One possible reason is that depository institutions in a highly concentrated market 
may wield an undue amount of political power, and thus caps could be a way of 
preventing this problem from arising. There is some history relevant to this concern. 
Neither the federal or state governments, after all, allowed banks to branch across state 
lines for roughly 200 years, which at least implicitly suggests that policy makers at all 
levels have long feared the power of large banks. Indeed, in 1836, Congress did not 
renew the charter for the Second National Bank of the United States (there was a First 
National Bank as its predecessor) out of concern that too much power would be 
concentrated in a single federal bank, to the detriment of rural interests. In the early 20
th 
century, the federal government created the Federal Reserve System largely because 
policy makers were uncomfortable relying on one bank – and one individual, J.P. Morgan 
– to rescue the banking system when troubled. While this action relates to a concern   8
about “systemic risk” that is taken up shortly, it also appears to have been motivated by 
the concern that a single bank could have too much influence on national policy.   
  If there ever was a real basis for this concern – and it is not clear that there was – 
there is no basis for it now. As a threshold matter, the banking industry as a whole no 
longer is the largest financial industry, measured by asset size, in the United States. At 
roughly $6 trillion in total deposits, the industry is now overmatched by the mutual fund 
industry, which has approximately $9 trillion in assets.  
Perhaps more fundamentally, the evidence is mixed, at best, as to whether large 
organizations, in any industry, wield an undue amount of political power. For one thing, 
large companies typically have opposition from other large companies on public policy 
issues, and thus no single company can count on having its views swallowed whole. The 
financial industry itself provides a good example: large banking organizations for years 
wanted to engage in other financial businesses, but were strongly opposed by large 
securities and insurance firms. Only after nearly two decades did Congress finally allow 
firms from each of the industries to own each other, when it passed GLBA. The 
continuing battles over telecommunications reform -- which yielded an unwieldy 
Congressional compromise in 1996 and which continue to this day -- provide another 
example: ten years ago, the large regional Bell Operating Companies were on opposite 
sides from the long-distance providers and from the cable industry, whereas today it is 
the large remaining telecommunications companies fighting it out with such high-tech 
giants as Microsoft, Google and Amazon over the right pricing regime for the Internet of 
the future.  
Second, industries populated by many small firms or organizations made up of 
many individuals often have as much, if not more, political heft than large organizations. 
For example, organizations such as the National Rifle Association, the AARP, and the 
teachers’ unions, have legendary political clout in Washington, arguably much more than 
any single bank or firm in an another industry.  
Third, America has an almost a mystical attachment to its small banks, and totally 
apart from pure antitrust notions, there may be an emotional fear that if existing large 
banking organizations were permitted to grow larger – even if their acquisitions and size 
and behavior were consistent with the antitrust laws – small banks will disappear. While   9
understandable, this fear is misplaced. Since Riegle-Neal and subsequently Gramm-
Leach-Bliley, many thousands of small banks (those with assets below $1 billion, or even 
below $100 million) continue to thrive. Indeed, the banking authorities have been 
receiving applications for new bank charters in the hundreds each year even as the 
industry has been consolidating at the top since these two acts were passed. This is 
because many Americans choose to “bank” with small banks and credit unions (which 
offer essentially the same services as banks and which have been growing, on average, 
since 1994) because they like the personal touch and feel of being able to walk into a 
bank lobby where the employees have been there for years and know them by name. 
Small banks would continue to be there to service this segment of the American 
population even if deposit share caps were removed, and replaced by the antitrust laws. 
There are examples from other industries where this is so. The insurance industry 
is unconcentrated, yet has a few nationwide large firms, competing alongside many local 
and regional competitors. Likewise, even many small corner grocery stores or specialty 
shops continue to exist throughout the country, despite the growth of the large-scale 
chains and “big-box” retailers. There is no reason to think that banking would be any 
different, if as is true for other industries, concentration through mergers (and abuse of 
dominant power, if any) is policed by the antitrust enforcement agencies (as indeed the 
banking industry has been even with the caps in place).  
 
To prevent systemic risk:  
A second possible reason for imposing a deposit market share cap on banks is to 
prevent some banks from growing so large that their failure could threaten the financial 
system, and in turn, the economy as a whole. The intellectual rationale for this alleged 
second reason might be found in a famous essay -- “Are Banks Special?” -- written in the 
early 1980’s by E. Gerald Corrigan, then President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis and later President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
7 One of the 
answers that Corrigan supplied to his own question is that banks have a special role in the 
economy not only because they are important sources of finance, but also because they 
                                                 
7 Corrigan, Gerald, 1982. “Are Banks Special?”, Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
available at http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm.   10
operate the payments system. If one or more large banks should fail, the risk arises that 
the payments system could become gridlocked, severely curtailing commerce and 
damaging consumer confidence. Just such a reality loomed after the stock market crash of 
October, 1987, but was averted through promises of liquidity from the Federal Reserve 
System.  
How might further banking concentration contribute to what economists now call 
“systemic risk”? One possible line of argument with which many in Congress in 1994 
might have been familiar is that, without appropriate government oversight, larger banks 
either are more prone to getting into financial trouble than other banks, or that when they 
do have problems, the risks of failure they pose to the financial system – whether through 
the payments system or possibly through contagious bank runs – is, almost by definition, 
much greater than is the case for smaller banks. In 1994, or even in 1982 when Corrigan 
wrote his article, these were not theoretical concerns. After all, the nation’s largest banks 
did over-extend themselves during the 1980s in lending to less developed countries, a 
course of activity that put many of them in financial danger. Later in the decade, a 
number of the same banks (and other large ones, especially in New England), became 
heavily exposed to commercial real estate borrowers. When real estate markets turned 
down, those banks suffered steep losses and some of them failed.  
Much has changed over the past two decades to ease concerns that these events 
might repeat themselves. First, and perhaps most important, large banks and indeed the 
entire banking system are far stronger financially than was true in the 1980s, due largely 
to FDICIA’s stiffer and more effectively enforced capital standards introduced in 1991, 
as well as to insistence by investors that the banks be even better capitalized than 
required by law.  
Second, the principal payments systems – the privately operated CHIPs system 
(which processes payments daily by the nation’s largest banks) and the Federal Reserve’s 
Fedwire system – are in much stronger shape than they were before the 1987 stock 
market crash. After that event, CHIPs worked hard to change its various rules so that the 
system could withstand the failure of not one, but at least two, of its largest members. 
Meanwhile, the Fed has adopted pricing and other reforms that have dramatically reduced 
the risks of daily “overdrafts” that pose a financial risk to the Federal Reserve.    11
Third, as for banks’ “special-ness” in lending, that has been eroded significantly 
over the past two decades as more public companies have turned to the capital markets 
for funds, issuing either short-term debt (commercial paper) or long-term debt. It is true 
that commercial paper still typically requires a bank guarantee as a backup source of 
“credit enhancement,” but the primary lending activity is conducted in the market and not 
by banks. In a related development, banks at the same time have off-loaded increasing 
amounts of their lending risks to insurance companies and other buyers of “credit 
derivatives.” While there may be legitimate concerns about how this risk is now 
distributed throughout the financial system, one thing is clear: less of it is concentrated in 
banks than it otherwise would be.
8   
In sum, the systemic risk rationale for deposit caps is far weaker than it might 
have been in 1994. Moreover, as is argued below, it is possible that the current deposit 
market share caps may aggravate that risk to the extent they lead to more large banks that 
might be deemed “too large to fail.”  
 
To prevent the development of “Too big to fail banks”:   
The third possible justification for a deposit share cap is related to the second: 
namely, that because large banks arguably entail a disproportionate risk to the overall 
financial and economic system, having a more concentrated banking system may enhance 
the number of “too big to fail” (TBTF) banks, or banks that are so large that the federal 
government cannot permit their uninsured depositors and perhaps other uninsured 
creditors to take a loss, for fear of triggering a contagious run on other banks in the 
system.
9  
The TBTF argument was the main rationale for the federal government’s 
protection of uninsured depositors when Continental Illinois failed in 1984, the Bank of 
New England failed in 1990, and arguably contributed to decisions by federal regulators 
                                                 
8 For a thorough discussion of credit derivatives and some of the risks they may present, see Frank Partnoy, 
“How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers,” in Yasuyuki Fuchita and Robert 
E. Litan, eds., Financial Gatekeepers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).  
9 The term “too big to fail” actually is a misnomer. It more accurately refers to banks that are so large that 
government deems it necessary to bail out their uninsured depositors and possibly unsecured creditors, but 
not their shareholders.  
   12
in the 1980s to not strictly enforce capital standards for large banks that had large 
unrecognized losses on developing country debt at that time (a policy known as 
“regulatory forbearance”). One possible argument in favor of the deposit caps is that they 
might help avert future such episodes, which not only unfairly benefit large banks (and 
harm smaller banks that do not evoke such guarantees), but also put taxpayers at risk for 
mistakes made by private sector actors, thus possibly encouraging more of them in the 
future. 
  While concerns about TBTF institutions are quite real and remain, the deposit 
share caps are not likely to reduce the risks they entail, and may even increase TBTF 
risks. For one thing, the more banks are diversified geographically, the less likely it is 
that they will fail. Whatever may be the experience nationally at any point in time, the 
economies of different states and regions always are moving at different speeds and 
possibly in different directions. Banks that have businesses in many different states are 
like investors with multiple stocks in their portfolios – they are more broadly diversified, 
and thus should have smoother earnings than banks that are limited to doing business in 
small geographic areas or in particular lines of business. Deposit share caps already 
prevent some of the largest banks from having a significant presence in all 50 states, and 
thus inhibit the opportunities for geographic diversification by larger banks that could 
lower their risk of failure, and thus the risk that the TBTF issue might arise.  
  But even if this were not the case, the hard reality is that since the federal 
government already has “bailed out” the uninsured depositors of banks with roughly $35-
40 billion in deposits, or roughly $100 billion in today’s dollars – as it did when the 
authorities came to the rescue of such depositors of Continental Illinois, the Bank of New 
England, and several large banks in Texas – then it is highly likely, if not certain, that it 
would do the same for many and possibly all of the top ten depository institutions today 
(which as shown in Table 3 all have deposits near or above the inflation-adjusted level of 
the total deposits of the former Continental and Bank of New England). If this is true, and 
history suggests that this proposition certainly is plausible, then there is little evidence 
that the deposit market share caps have limited the TBTF risk. 
To the contrary, it is quite possible that the deposit caps could perversely create 
more TBTF banks by limiting the growth of the leading banks, and promoting instead the   13
growth of many more banks near their size. That is, the nation may face a larger TBTF 
risk from having a dozen or more large banks, each with say a 5-10 percent market share, 
than a more concentrated (but still competitive) market in which perhaps 3-4 banks had 
60-70 percent of the market among them, with thousands of smaller banks dividing up 
the rest of the market.  
Finally, even if the TBTF rationale for the deposit market share caps had some 
substance, it must be weighed against the counter-productive impacts of the caps, a 
subject that is taken up next. 
 
4. Counterproductive Impacts of the Current Deposit Caps 
 
  At several points already, I have noted how financial markets and laws have 
changed dramatically over the past two decades, and since Reigle-Neal become law in 
1994 in particular. One other change is noteworthy. As supporters of market share caps 
correctly anticipated, the legislation allowing interstate branching has led to further 
concentration in the depository industry, primarily through mergers. Table 3 shows the 
deposit shares of the top 10 depository organizations in the United States, as of mid-2005 
(one of them, Washington Mutual, is not a bank, incidentally). Comparing Table 3 and 
Table 1, it is evident that all of the top players have larger market shares than did the top 
players in 1994, before Riegle-Neal became law. None, however, has a national market 
share over the 10% deposit share ceiling – since, otherwise, none of these banks would be 
permitted to make any more acquisitions. But Bank of America’s market share is right 
below the 10% limit and JP Morgan Chase and Wachovia (if its merger with Golden 





Top Nationwide Domestic Deposit Shares, Bank Holding Companies 
June, 2005 
 
Organization     Deposits  (Billions)   Percentage 
 
Bank  of  America    577     9.6 
JP  Morgan  Chase    406     6.8 
Wachovia  Bank*    286     4.8    
Wells  Fargo     261     4.4 
Citigroup     206     3.5 
Washington  Mutual    185     3.1 
U.S.  Bankcorp     117     2.0 
Suntrust     107     1.8 
Royal  Bank  of  Scotland   99     1.7 
National  City     76     1.3 
 
Source: FDIC (www.fdic.gov) 
 
*This share figure does not account for the increase in deposits that Wachovia will 
experience if its proposed merger with Golden West is approved.  
 
 
  The rising deposit shares of the top players should be no surprise, since banking 
markets were fragmented for more than 200 years prior to the enactment of Riegle-Neal. 
After that bill became law, the quickest way for banks to establish a nationwide footprint, 
like other retail firms and financial service companies that were not previously limited in 
where they could conduct business, was to merge with banks in other regions. And that is 
exactly what most of the firms in Table 3, as well as many other banks right below them 
in size, have done since 1994.  
  As long as the nationwide deposit market share cap remains in place, one would 
expect that other firms on the list right below Bank of America will continue merging 
until they catch up, in market share, to the market leader. Perhaps that is what Congress 
intended in 1994 when it put caps into effect in the first place: to ensure that a handful of 
relatively equal-sized firms developed their own national footprints, and that at a later 
point, the deposit cap would be lifted. If so, that day is not far off. With the right mergers,   15
several of the depositories on the top 10 list would jump to parity with Bank of America 
relatively quickly.  
  But at that point, and indeed even now for the banks at or near the top of the list, 
the deposit market share cap creates a number of perverse incentives.  
  Before outlining them, it is important to recognize, as a threshold matter, that no 
profit-making organization that sits still can expect much of a future. The stock market 
only rewards growth. And companies that do not have growth plans invite stagnation at 
best, or departure of their best people, at worst. Deposit marker share caps, even though 
applicable to mergers, stunt internal growth, and distort other growth opportunities. 
  The caps stunt internal growth in the banking business because as banks near the 
cap they lose the ability to merge and to quickly extend their geographic footprint. As a 
result, banks near the cap are discouraged from offering their current (let alone 
prospective) customers competitive interest rates on deposits, which clearly harms their 
existing customers and reduces competition. These results must be inconsistent with the 
intent of those who might have advocated the caps in the first place.      
Second, if banking organizations cannot expand in their own line of business – 
sticking to their “core competence,” which various management experts have suggested 
is the soundest business strategy to follow – they have only two other choices for 
increasing their revenue and profits. Either they can expand into other financial activities 
in the United States, which GLBA permits them to do, or they can expand abroad.  
Judging from the track record of other large banking organization so far, however, 
the potential profits of the “one-stop shopping” model appear to be elusive. As already 
noted, Citigroup, perhaps the strongest proponent of this model pre-GLBA, has since sold 
off some of its non-banking businesses, underscoring the difficulties of cross-selling 
different types of financial products to the same customer base. To be sure, some non-
banking enterprises, including mutual fund companies and some insurers, have opened or 
acquired their own depository institutions, which seems to validate the one-stop shopping 
idea. But taken as a whole, the experience of the financial services industry suggests it is 
far too soon to determine whether expansion by banks in particular into other non-
banking financial activities will turn out, on average, to be financially promising.    16
Meanwhile, despite the increasing globalization of financial activities and capital 
markets, relatively few American banks have embarked on major global expansions. In 
part, this may reflect risk aversion stemming from the banks’ disappointing (if not 
disastrous) experience with lending to developing country governments in the 1970s and 
1980s. It also may reflect the operational difficulties and risks of expanding into 
unknown markets, against entrenched local institutions. Whatever the cause, a 
fundamental question arises: why should U.S. policy have any tilt, however unintended, 
toward encouraging U.S. banks to expand abroad rather than to engage more vigorously 
in competition at home? Yet that arises precisely because of the existing deposit market 
share caps. It is an outcome that not only probably was unforeseen by those who 
supported the caps at the time they were introduced, but is also potentially inconsistent 
with the objectives of encouraging more banking competition in the domestic market as 
well as less risky endeavors by banks, so as not to impair their financial soundness.  
  Third, the deposit caps actually work in two ways to the disadvantage of U.S. 
banks in the global marketplace, another outcome very likely not anticipated at the time 
the caps were enacted. For one thing, the caps inhibit U.S. banks from purchasing foreign 
banks with U.S. subsidiaries or branches that have U.S. deposits that would put the 
acquiring U.S. bank over the nationwide or state-specific caps. Looking ahead, this 
constraint is especially binding for U.S. banks that are close to the nationwide cap, which 
means as a practical matter, one of these banks that wanted to build a global brand by 
acquiring a major foreign institution would be prevented from doing so even if that 
institution had only a small fraction of its total deposits in the United States – but just 
enough to put the acquiring U.S. institution “over the cap.”  Instead, because of the cap, 
U.S. banks close to the cap but seeking to build a global brand would be restricted to 
partnering only with foreign banks that essentially have no U.S. presence. What can 
possibly be the rationale for a law that, in practice, has the effect of making this 
distinction?   
In addition, since the caps only apply to domestic deposits held in the United 
States, it does not inhibit foreign banks from buying U.S. banks – even large ones – if the 
foreign banks are not already highly active in the U.S. market (as a few of them are, such 
as the Royal Bank of Scotland or HSBC). Meanwhile, because the caps may remove   17
some U.S. banks as potential acquirers of other U.S. banks, either currently or at some 
point in the near future, they therefore have the effect therefore of giving large foreign 
banks an artificial advantage in acquiring U.S. banks. It is highly unlikely that the 
advocates of deposit market share caps would welcome growing foreign ownership of 
U.S. banks as an unintended, but potentially very real, outcome of the caps (to the extent 
foreign acquisition occurs naturally, and not for artificial reasons, this should be 
welcomed or at least not opposed; it is dubious policy, however, to encourage foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. financial institutions unless it is to help reduce the costs of U.S. bank 




  The obvious implication of the foregoing arguments is that the current deposit 
market share caps in Riegle-Neal should be repealed, with instructions that bank mergers 
should be judged by the same competitive standards that now apply to mergers of all 
other kinds of firms (It is a separate question whether antitrust scrutiny still should be 
divided between the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division and the banking regulatory 
agencies (the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency or the FDIC, depending 
on the nature of the bank’s charter and whether the merger is at the bank or the holding 
company level. Good arguments can be made on both sides of this question). The 
competition and regulatory authorities have a long history of applying well-developed 
guidelines to bank mergers, and there is no reason why these guidelines, together with the 
merger case law that exists, shouldn’t be the exclusive touchstones for evaluating bank 
mergers. 
  If Congress is unwilling to go this far, there are two alternative measures it could 
adopt. 
  First, since much of the foregoing argument has been aimed at the nationwide 
cap, any repeal could be limited to this component of the policy, leaving the statewide 
caps in place. After all, a state in which three banks each had 30 percent of the market   18
(the default statewide ceiling in Riegle-Neal) easily would be “highly concentrated” 
under the current antitrust merger guidelines.
10 
  Second, the national and state caps would be less binding if the deposit market 
shares were calculated by expanding the definition of the “market” from the current total 
of bank and thrift deposits to a new definition that also includes the functional equivalent 
of these deposits, namely deposits at credit unions and shares held in money market 
mutual funds. Under this approach, the 10 percent and 30 percent caps would be less 
restrictive, since a more comprehensive definition of deposits would be in the 
denominator of the calculation.   
  Each of these fallback measures are just that, however, fallbacks. The preferable 
course is to recognize that there no longer is any substantive justification (if there ever 
was) for singling out bank mergers to be treated any differently from mergers in other 
industries.  
    
 
                                                 
10 The sum of the squares of the 30 percent market shares of these banks alone would be 2700 (900 x 3), 
which would put the HHI well over the 1800 threshold that defines a “highly concentrated” market. 